We study a selection method for a Nash feedback equilibrium of a one-dimensional linear-quadratic nonzero sum game over an infinite horizon: by introducing a change in the time variable, one obtains an associated game over a finite horizon T 0 and with free terminal state. This associated game...

We consider a capital accumulation game between two different jurisdictions. When the jurisdictions adopt open loop strategies, we study the inefficiency of the steady state Nash equilibrium with respect to the steady state utilitarian solution.

We present a new extension of the Shapley value for games with communication structure,only pairwise meetings can occur when some of them are not permitted.The present extension is a new one and in particular it is di .erent from the Myerson value,from the position value,and from a previous...

In 1989, the United Kingdom Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14000 public houses. The MMC claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice. Since that time, however, retail...

The aim of this paper is to present an approach to the middleman problem in the context of cooperative games when communication between players is graph-restricted. We consider a set of three axioms: linearity, dummy player and independence of non connected coalitions. These axioms are generally...

In this paper we study the players' reasoning in nomral form games. To this end we generalize the concept of objective correlated equilibrium distributions introduced by Aumann (1987) to the subjective case.

In economic two players games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash Equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule has to be amended if the game features strategic substituability.

The preemptive role of capital is analysed in a class of two-player symmetric capital accumulation differential games with reversible investment. It is proved that, in the medium run, the firm with better initial condition exploits its advantage when the game features feedback substituability....

This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Two associated games are defined and a consistency axiom is required. The construction of the associated games presupposes that coalitions behave in an aggressive manner towards players who are not...

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a class of games of group formation. The use of potential allows for a characterisation of such an equilibrium.