The main objects here are two-stage games in which players first compete and subsequently collaborate. We consider instances where second-stage collaboration is anticipated and sustained in terms of core solutions.

The main objects here are noncooperative games in which all externalities occur via a one-dimensional variable. So-called mean-value iterates are used to approach Nash equilibrium. The proposed schemes generalize many received methods, and can be interpreted as learning taking place during...

Emission of uniformly dispersed greenhouse gases in construed here as a cooperative production game, featuring side-payments, quata exchange, uncertainty, and multi-period planning. Stochastic programming offers good instruments to analyze such games. Absent efficient markets for emissions, such...

Motivated by non-cooperative games we study repeated interaction among non-communicating agents, each dealing with his block of variables, each moving merely on the basis of his marginal payoff and its most recent change.

We present a new subgame perfect equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game, which has Basu's triadic model as the stage game. The payoff for the laborer is the same as in Basu's model. The equilibrium is more robust than the solution in Naqvi and Wemhoner in the sense that the equilibrium does...

We consider repeated interaction among several producers of a homogeneous, divisible good, traded at a common market. Demand is uncertain, and its law is unknown.

We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation...

We look at private-provision-of-public goods games. These games share an assumption that family members non-cooperatively use their resources either to acquire a private good or a family-specific good. What exactly constitutes the "private good" and the "public good" will be seen to vary from...

Motivated by repeated play of non-cooperative games, we study equation solving undertaken in parallel by several non-communicating agents, each dealing with his own block of variables. The process is akin to Newton's method in using derivative information. It does, however, proceed without...

A special class of cooperative transferable-utility games where each agent faces an optimization problem constrained by resources that can be pooled among coalition members, so-called production games, are here extended and applied in novel ways. First, I relax linearity requirements; second, I...