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Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
Recent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the … dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government … authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317025
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014245968
This paper explores conditions under which dictators comply with a social contract. We assume society to consist of two groups, one with a comparative advantage in using violence, the other one with a comparative advantage in producing private goods. Violence can be used to produce security or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077672
This paper explores the conditions under which compliance with a social contract establishes an equilibrium in a society. It is assumed that society consists of two groups, one of which has a comparative advantage in using violence, whereas the other one has a comparative advantage in producing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014169077
The selection of political representatives depends on the political system. Principals, such as voters or districts, may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves. While a status-quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator, an enthusiastic representative has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224332
In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538846
In this paper we study the influence of economic stability on the level of corruption in a country, where high … exogenous shocks to economic output where politicians can decide about the level of corruption and an election is held within … the framework of a Bayesian game. Corruption is assumed to be harmful to the economy and politicians try to maximize …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440449
Information affecting a candidate's reputation might have significant electoral consequences. Do candidates respond to the release of information? Using Brazilian elections and audits as an exogenous source of information, I show that both incumbent and challenger increase their campaign...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012545128
The paper studies the link between corruption and social capital (measured as trust), using data from a lab experiment … behind any such behavioral spillover. Results suggest that a) there is a negative spillover effect of corruption on trust and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455846