Showing 1 - 10 of 1,116
Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578203
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702527
In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction-design, we show that in a specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674603
The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. The type graph for a voter is a graph whose vertices are the possible types of the voter. Two vertices are connected by an edge in the graph if the associated types are "neighbors." A social choice function is locally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806446
document a trade-off between equity and efficiency in that average payoffs are larger under Boston than under Deferred …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544973
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001674580
We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041039
order additivity condition. This result contrasts well with various results on the incompatibility between efficiency and ex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212939
Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014225211
Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally single-peaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some one-dimensional ordering. While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected coalitions that have a "hole" in the ordering,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014118587