This paper explores the prisoner’s dilemma that may result when workers and firms are involved in labour disputes and must decide whether to hire a lawyer to be represented at trial. Using a representative data set of labour disputes in the UK and a large population of French unfair dismissal...

This paper creates a game theoretic model to determine how pendulum arbitration or baseball arbitration impacts the incentives of litigants. Pendulum arbitration is when both parties submit competing proposals and the arbitrator chooses only one of the bids, in its entirety, to be binding on...

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

We examine settings - such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war - in which players first make non-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is efficient ex post, but we show that a player may...

We conduct dictator games in our artefactual field experiment with 11th and 12th grade students in New Delhi, India. We construct an economic status index based on household ownership of assets for our subjects. Using cut-offs from this index, we randomly match dictators to recipients who are...

This essay borrows heavily from the fields of game theory, baseball business strategy and neuropsychology. Knitting these together, the author advocates that mediators become inciters and advocates for an outcome that solves problems, irrespective of the amount in controversy and the initial gap...

In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that...

This study proposes a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game model to analyse wage negotiations between one employer and two workers. Here, randomly selected workers choose whether to negotiate their wage contracts together or separately, considering wage contract externalities. We show...

This paper asserts that game theory can be a valuable tool in dispute system design efforts. The premise is simple: If different dispute system designs have different impacts on the decisions and behaviors of participants, then game theory can be used to help logically think through the...

Prior studies of CEO power have mostly focused on internal corporate governance as the balance of CEO power but neglected the effect of labor. We attempt to explore the power play between the CEO and labor in a special type of corporate restructuring - outsourcing. Fundamentally, outsourcing may...