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We examine innovation as a market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. We allow for heterogenous payoffs between players, and for a leader's payoff functions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic. Assuming that the follower's payoff is non-increasing with the time...
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We examine innovation in an $n$-player market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. In our novel multi-player setup, we allow for heterogeneous payoffs between players and for a leader's payofffunctions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic, only requiring that...
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We examine innovation as a timing game with complete information and observable actions in which firms decide when to enter a market. We characterize all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two-player symmetric game. In particular, we describe all subgame perfect equilibria when...
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We study contests in which the prize depends on the number of participants, and show that equilibrium effort can be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the number of participants. This contrasts with the standard result for contests with fixed prizes in which effort is decreasing in the...
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