We study dynamic Bayesian persuasion in an entry game. A sender publicly reveals information to an adopter and a … exaggerates the value of a technology to attract the adopter, and then reveals negative information to deter the competitor … information later. Hype cycles are more severe in stagnant industries and with higher threat of competition, and arise in …

cooperative (or coalitional) stability of the whole industry cartel is the equidistance of firms’ products along the quality … spectrum. Without this property, and in presence of large quality differences, collusive agreements easily lose their stability … and intermediate firms and harder for the top quality firm. Finally, by means of a three-firm example, I consider the case …

quality, the second captures horizontal differentiation. Each consumer privately observes his own value for each good, but … cannot separate the common and the idiosyncratic component. Therefore, he has incomplete information about the value of the … coordination problem. In the efficient allocation, both networks are active and the firm with the highest expected quality has the …

single technological platform or not and at the same time they choose the quality of their product. In stage 2, the firms … compete in prices. We find that the firms' choice of quality and technological platform depends on the degree of product …