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unreliable experiences gained in the early trials of a game and the possibility of a revision of a reasonable alternative which …
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matched to interact in finitely repeated games. They form beliefs by learning from past behavior of others and then best …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116889
the (possibly misspecified) prior belief that her local network is the entire network. We present a tractable learning … rule to implement such locally Bayesian learning: each agent extracts new information using the full history of observed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159057
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689095
the (possibly misspecified) prior belief that her local network is the entire network. We present a tractable learning … rule to implement such locally Bayesian learning: each agent extracts new information using the full history of observed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859161
is that of limited information where agents play the game repeatedly and know their own efforts and outcomes. Players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323548