Showing 1 - 10 of 13,526
This paper examines the effect of firms’ lobbying activities on penalties received from public competition authorities …. We show that lobbying expenditures are negatively associated with the amount of the cartel sanction, within cartel. Our … estimates also report that cartel sanctions are more responsive to lobbying expenditures when (1) the head of the antitrust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014262313
This paper examines the effect of firms' lobbying activities on penalties received from public competition authorities …. For an average sanctioned firm, our model indicates that one additional dollar in lobbying yields to a decrease in cartel … sanction of 3.12 dollars. We also observe that cartel sanctions are more responsive to lobbying expenditures when (1) the head …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013295542
This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total … departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The … antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514012
lobbying are not restricted to the lobby's host-country but spill over to other member countries and have ambiguous effects on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517964
In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538846
The literature on both entry deterrence and the influence of special interest groups is extensive. In this paper we attempt to marry these strands of literature by developing a model of entry deterrence through interest group influence in an entry re-regulation context. In contrast to other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539115
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897539
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009236280
relevant information, we also assume that lobbies engage in non-negligible informational lobbying. We focus on a single … political decision to be taken and offer a simple model in which the optimal influence strategy is a mixture of both lobbying … lobbying so that less policy relevant information is available and as a result political decisions become less efficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780356
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001353158