Showing 1 - 10 of 16,909
We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592755
policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013326522
This paper considers endogenous coalition formations and endogenous technology choices in a model of private provision … contributions by a strategic incentive to adopt lower technology to motivate coalition building by other nations, which in the end …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643560
non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition … liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise … environment as well as for the coalition countries’ welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315868
The Kyoto summit initiated an international game of cap and trade. Unlike a national policy, the essence of this game is the self-selection of national emission targets. This differs from the standard global public-goods game because targets are met in the context of a global carbon market. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191875
Greenhouse gas abatement is a public good, so climate policy is a public-goods game and suffers from the free-rider incentives that make the outcome of such games notoriously uncooperative. Adopting an international agreement can change the nature of the game, reducing or exacerbating the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044933
coalition, and regions which have the highest claims according to the respective sharing rule. Furthermore, we find that a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603652
In this paper we analyze how ratification uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the ratification stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339399
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457939
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010207913