bank has private (but incomplete) information on the state of the economy. A central bank that is better informed than the … management in the sense of withholding information is an equilibrium. A simple extension of our findings is that, if the … government occasionally learns about the central bank's true information, it actually does overrule the central bank's decision …

conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows … that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents …

incomplete information, and the government can not observe the current state perfectly. We accommodate the notion of Odyssean …

precision of public information or withholding it. The latter seems to be unrealistic. Thus, the issue is not whether central … bank should disclose or not its information, but how the central bank should disclose it. We consider a static coordination … game in which the private sector receives n semi-public information plus their specific information, and we analyse the …

In this paper we examine whether publishing the information underlying the central bank's decisions is socially … the distortions stemming from heterogeneous information. However, transparency generally raises the variance of inflation …