Similar Search Results

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003822584

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo - In: Social choice and welfare 36 (2011) 2, pp. 179-198

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839664

Contingent commodities and implementation

Chattopadhyay, Subir Kumar; Corchón, Luis C.; Naeve, Jörg - In: Economics letters 68 (2000) 3, pp. 293-298

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001499251

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games

Wilkie, Simon (contributor); Beviá, Carmen (contributor); … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001610675

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games

Beviá, Carmen; Corchón, Luis C.; Wilkie, Simon - In: Review of economic design : RED 7 (2002) 4, pp. 429-442

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001766825

Contingent commodities and implementation

Chattopadhyay, Subir Kumar - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000986527

Monopolistic competition : equilibrium and optimality

Corchón, Luis C. - 1990 - 1. ed

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000143101

Implementation with Renegotiation When Preferences and Feasible Sets are State Dependent

Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo - 2013

In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infea- sible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renego- tiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equi-...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014192915