We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

This paper considers the e effcts of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...

Most previous research on efficiency in banking takes a regulatory perspective. In contrast, this paper investigates the empirical relation between efficiency and profitability in five large economies of the European Union during the period 1998-2005 and discusses the results from the...

The discussion about employee representation on supervisory boards has received much attention from scholars and politicians around the world. We provide new insights to this ongoing debate by employing power indices from game theory to examine the "real" power of employees on boards and its...

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die wechselseitige Beziehung zwischen Unternehmenserfolg und einer familienbewussten Personalpolitik. Anhand der Schätzung eines simultanen Gleichungssystems mit den Daten des IAB-Betriebspanels zeigt sich, dass eine gute Geschäftsentwicklung für ein...

Viele nordamerikanische multinationale Unternehmen versuchen, standardisierte Verhaltenskodices in ihren europäischen Tochtergesellschaften zu implementieren, um Verhaltenweisen zu kontrollieren und um eine homogene Unternehmenskultur zu entwickeln. Durch die starke nordamerikanische...