I develop a simple new model of strategic trade with endogenous timing, generalizaing Glosten and Milgrom (1985) : A competitive market maker faces n risk neutral traders with unit demands or suppliers. It is private information whether any given trader is either informed, with a heterogeneous...

We analyse an economy where production is subject to moral hazard.

This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of complete information , such as first price auctions, to have pure trategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). The paper treats games between two or more heterogeneous agents, each with private information about his own type (for example, a...

This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive.

Given standard, transparent assumptions, this paper questions the Wall Street adage that 'timing is everything'. I show that for an Arrow security, a 'small' risk-neutral trader with private information that is conditionally independent of the public information is exactly indifferent about the...

This paper describes information exchange under the Sugar Institute, the trade association of U.S. domestic sugar cane refiners, between 1928 and 1936. The Institute collected production and delivery data from the individual firms and returned i t to them in aggregated form. Attempts to exchange...

We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advanced and less developed economies differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. This lack of information makes it hard to give the right incentiv es to managers and entrepreneurs. We argue that...

This paper explores environments in which either the revelation or diffusion of information, or its incorporation into stock prices, is gradual, and develops appropriate estimation techniques. This paper has implications both for event study met hodology and for understanding the process by...