It is well known that, whereas in one-agent contexts the value of information is always positive, in strategic situations, this is not always the case. We will consider the class of games for which, under a specific information structure, there exists a unique Pareto payoff profile, and we show...

In this paper we show how a shift in a return distribution affects the composition of an optimal portfolio in the case of one riskless asset and two risky assets. We obtain that, in general, such a shift modifies the composition of themutual fund. We also show that the separating conditions...

In this research, we introduce information structure as a variable to explain differences in salary profiles and rates of separation among firm.

The paper discusses several topics such Nash equilibria, repeated games. It also discusses applications to market games, regulation and R&D games.

We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.

A market with asymmetric information on product quality that entails both adverse selection and moral hazard problems is considered.

This paper describes the historical evolution of the analysis of some aspects of the strategic use of information. The use of mixed strategies aims to create uncertainty on the move to be played or on the private information of the players. In a repeated game framework, strategic behavior when...