We study how optimal contracts are modified when the agent has the possibility to acquire information before the contract is offered to him. We consider a situation in which this information is always available to the agent just before producing. Therefore, prior information acquisition is...

This paper proposes a model which intends to analyse the alternative between discrimination and mutualisation in insurance. We suppose there exists an observable (but initially hidden)variable, that predicts the level of risk of an individual. This variable can be observed through a testing...

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost 'g' to learn it.Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependingon the value of 'g', try to induce the agent to gather or not to gather...

We analyze a model related to the strategic hereding literature where a second expert maximises his expected second period vvalue by conforming witj a first expert ("herding"). In contrast to the herdinfg literature we assume that an agent is most valuable if he is the only smart agent. We...

In this paper we show how the order of Linear Stochastic Dominance proposed by Gollier (1995) can be applied to situations with dependent risky assets.

L'objet de cet article est de presenter une synthese de la litterature theorique concernant les interactions entre strategies financieres et strategies de production.

We investigate in this paper the attitude towards risk of bettors in British horce races. The model we use allows us to go beyond the expected utility framework and to explore various alternative proposals by estimating a multinomial model on 34443-race dataset. We find that rank-dependant...

This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who perfectly knows thecharasteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has no information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian...

This paper shows how the instruments of incentive theory can be used to develop some views about the proper design of governments to avoid the capture of politicians and bureaucrats by interest groups.