Contracts and Productive Information Gathering.

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost 'g' to learn it.Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependingon the value of 'g', try to induce the agent to gather or not to gather information. We study the tradeoffs that are involved.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Cremer, J. ; Khalil, F. ; Rochet, J-C.
Institutions:	Groupe de Recherche en Économie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Subject:	INFORMATION

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Series:	Toulouse - GREMAQ.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	25 pages
Classification:	D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486536