We examine an important class of decision problem under uncertainty that entails the standarrd portfolio problem and the demand for coinsurance. The agent faces a controllable risk -his demand for a risky asset for example- and a background risk. We determine how a change in the distribution in...

Cet article traite des relaions entre un principal, quie veut se procurer un bien, et les deux agents impliques dans le processus de production de ce bien. Les couts des agents constituent une information privee. Le principal confie la production du bien fini a l'un des agents, qui en...

In three-tier principal-agent models, there is foten concern about the risk of collusion between the supervisor hired by the principal to deal with the agent, and the agent. A collusion-proof contract is often optimal, altough the literature has produced some situations in which collusion is...

This paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influences the accountability of politicians, In a framework the politicians are only controled through reelection rules, we study the effect of economic integration on the reelection rules chosen by the voters and try to...

In this paper we show how the order of Linear Stochastic Dominance proposed by Gollier (1995) can be applied to situations with dependent risky assets.

L'objet de cet article est de presenter une synthese de la litterature theorique concernant les interactions entre strategies financieres et strategies de production.

We investigate in this paper the attitude towards risk of bettors in British horce races. The model we use allows us to go beyond the expected utility framework and to explore various alternative proposals by estimating a multinomial model on 34443-race dataset. We find that rank-dependant...

This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who perfectly knows thecharasteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has no information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian...

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost 'g' to learn it.Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependingon the value of 'g', try to induce the agent to gather or not to gather...