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Implementation without incentive compatibility : two stories with partially informed planners
Shimoji, Makoto; Schweinzer, Paul - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009572165
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All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying
Korpela, Ville - 2014
constraint in implementation and all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503049
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Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 1, pp. 12-14
We derive several implications of incentive compatibility in general (i.e., not necessarily quasilinear) environments. Building on Kos and Messner (2013), we provide a (partial) characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702790
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All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying
Korpela, Ville - Turun Kauppakorkeakoulu, Turun Yliopisto - 2014
constraint in implementation and all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096879
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Implementation without incentive compatibility : two stories with partially informed planners
Shimoji, Makoto; Schweinzer, Paul - In: Games and economic behavior 91 (2015), pp. 258-267
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011385791
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Rationalizable Implementation
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Tercieux, Olivier - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A … concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive (i.e., it never selects the same outcome in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008476247
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Rationalizable Implementation
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009
This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated …) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998323
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Privacy in implementation
Gradwohl, Ronen - 2013
In most implementation frameworks, agents care only about the outcome and not at all about the way in which it was … obtained. Additionally, typical mechanisms for full implementation involve the complete revelation of all private information … to the planner. In this paper I consider the problem of full implementation with agents who may prefer to protect their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009718302
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Non-implementation of Rational Expectations as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 2004
We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704188
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Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier; Holden, Richard - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 284-290
We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738055