Efficiency of the board structure is usually perceived as linked to a higher degree of monitoring. If monitoring improves performance measurement signals, on which a manager is compensated, it can be considered desirable from the manager's point of view. As a result, having a low degree of board...

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent academic research hints at the social network of board of directors as an important conduit for coordinating corporate governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing...

This paper studies how hedge fund activism reshapes board monitoring, CEO incentives and compensation. I find that activists target CEOs who have co-opted the board, have poor performance records and weak equity portfolio incentives, are less subject to relative performance evaluation (RPE) but...

Extensive research finds that shareholder and CEO preferences affect demand for director services. We find a large body of evidence that independent director reputation incentives influence the supply of director services. These reputation incentives vary across firms and over time,...

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent academic research hints at the social network of board of directors as an important conduit for coordinating corporate governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing...