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Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms

Akbarpour, Mohammad - 2020

In a Vickrey auction, if one bidder can invest to increase his value, the combined mechanism including investments is still fully optimal. By contrast, for any β 1, there exist monotone allocation rules that guarantee a fraction β of the allocative optimum in the worst case, but such that the...

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