This paper studies the choice of organizational form under incomplete contracts. We identify an organizational form with a rule of ex-post bargaining and compare four types of organization: horizontal organizations, inverted pyramidal hierarchies, pyramidal hierarchies and vertical hierarchies....

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Consider a licensing contract where a monopolistic grid sells a license to a competitive licensee. Unless it is regulated, the grid will exploit its monopolistic position which, in turn, will imply an exploitation of the consumers who buy the end product from the licensee. Therefore, the...

The paper deals with the question of the governance of common-pool resources when exogenous enforcement is not available. We assert that the recent 'linked games approach' seems to neglect that in order to be effective and to deter agents free-riding and/or hold-up, a linked game has to register...