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We construct game theoretic foundations for bargaining in the shadow of a trial. Plaintiff and defendant both have noisy signals of a common-value trial judgment and make simultaneous offers to settle. If the offers cross, they settle on the average offer; otherwise, both litigants incur an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509331
We compare decisions by female and male judges in child support trials where a judge decides on the father's income allocation to children. We investigate two types of cases: 1) when fathers have a formal job, their income is known to judges, and awards are set as a fraction of it, and 2) when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314284
We construct game theoretic foundations for bargaining in the shadow of a trial. Plaintiff and defendant both have noisy signals of a common-value trial judgment and make simultaneous offers to settle. If the offers cross, they settle on the average offer; otherwise, both litigants incur an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319843
We examine the effect of "split-award" statutes (wherein the State takes a share of a punitive damages award) on equilibrium settlements and the incentives to go to trial. We find that split-award statutes simultaneously lower settlement amounts and the likelihood of trial, as both parties act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005003888
This paper explores the incentives of product designers to complexify products, and the resulting implications for overall product quality. In our model, a consumer can accept or reject a product proposed by a designer, who can affect the quality and the complexity of the product. While the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065103
strategically distorted information. This ambiguity about the type of spy gives rise to a non-standard signaling problem where both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in … final round. I analyze this signaling effect and characterize the equilibrium in this game. Compared to the benchmark model …, in which private valuations are revealed automatically before the final round and thus no signaling of bids takes place …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003768858
Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372971
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083
This work takes a closer look on the predominant assumption in usual lemon market models of having finitely many or even only two different levels of quality. We model a situation which is close to the classical monopolistic setting but admits an interval of possible quality values....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403068