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Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem
Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083
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Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem
Siemens, Ferdinand von (contributor) - 2005
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571
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Hanging together or hanged separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information
Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2014
group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012053740
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Hanging together or being hung separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information ; conference paper
Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2013
fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338972
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Cooperative transfer price negotiations under incomplete information
Brangewitz, Sonja; Haake, Claus-Jochen - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010194495
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Dynamic game under ambiguity : the sequential bargaining example, and a new "coase conjecture"
Besanko, David; Tong, Jian; Wu, Jason Jianjun - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011581240
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Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information
Gonzalez-Sanchez, Eric; Loyola, Gino - In: Mathematical social sciences 127 (2024), pp. 1-11
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014558613
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Revealing the value of relationships
Halac, Marina - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 179 (2023) 3/4, pp. 661-672
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487136
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Hanging together or being hung separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information
Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2013
group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724695
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Hanging together or being hung separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information
Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2013
group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009691706