Showing 1 - 10 of 496
This paper explores whether professional macroeconomic forecasters manipulate their forecasts to influence voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014583811
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325896
current paper develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare effects induced by alternative policy … groups in order to influence the public opinion. In the case of voting over the level of a productivity-enhancing public bad …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272713
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281930
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378822
committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This … is not the case in a closed committee where costs and benefits of insincere voting only arise when a voter is pivotal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319559
This paper analyses a model of electoral competition with lobbying, where candidates hold private information about their willingness to pander to lobbies, if elected. I show that this uncertainty induces risk-averse voters to choose candidates who implement policies biased in favor of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703380
uence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011984037
influence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011990008
Asymmetric information between voters and legislative representatives poses a major challenge to the functioning of representative democracy. We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011949175