This paper studies equilibrium selection in the generalized second price auction, employed by major search engines to sell online advertisement positions. We perturb the baseline model by introducing a bidder whose bid and participation are random (noise bidder). In this model, an efficient...

When a consumer uses a search engine such as Google, her decision to purchase from an advertisement is influenced by other ads displayed on the search page. This externality makes the advertiser's per Ad click profit depend on the set of other ads visible to the consumer. This paper studies the...

We present an empirical investigation of the role of marketing agencies in Google's online ad auctions. By combining data on advertisers' affiliation to marketing agencies with data on bidding in ad auctions, we analyze how changes in the concentration of clients in the same industry under the...

Online advertising often involves targeting ads to certain types of consumers where ads are commonly sold by generalized second price auctions. However, such an auction or mechanism could be considered unfair if similar consumers are consistently shown different ads or consistently receive...

Building upon the static model of Athey and Ellison (2008), we demonstrate the efficient convergence of dynamic position auctions in the presence of consumer search. The entry of low-quality advertisers does not slow this convergence. Our methods are extensions of those introduced by Cary et al....

Using data from "WebsiteX", one of the largest online marketplaces in the world, we estimate a structural model of sponsored search auctions where bidders have heterogeneous click-through curves. Unlike earlier studies, our model accommodates two stylized empirical facts: the advertiser...

We consider an ad network's problem of allocating the auction for each individual impression to an optimal subset of advertisers, with the goal of revenue maximization. This is a variant of bipartite matching, except that advertisers may strategize by choosing their bidding profiles and their...

We model an online display advertising environment in which "performance'' advertisers can measure the value of individual impressions, whereas "brand" advertisers cannot. If advertiser values for ad opportunities are positively correlated, second-price auctions for impressions can be...

Keyword advertising, or "sponsored links" that appear alongside online search results or other online content, has grown into a multibillion-dollar market. Providers of keyword advertising, such as Google and Yahoo!, profit by auctioning keywords to advertisers. One issue of increasing...

Poor user experiences with search advertisements can lead to ad avoidance thus reduce search engine’s long-term revenue. We capture the effect of negative user experiences on search engine’s future revenue in a new variable called “shadow costs” and examine the optimal keyword auction...