We prove that pillage games (Jordan, 2006, “Pillage and property”, JET) can have multiple stable sets, constructing pillage games with up to 2^{(n-1)/3} stable sets, when the number of agents, n, exceeds four. We do so by violating the anonymity axiom common to the existing literature,...

Pillage games (Jordan, 2006, “Pillage and property”, JET) have two features that make them richer than cooperative games in either characteristic or partition function form: they allow power externalities between coalitions; they allow resources to contribute to coalitions' power as well as...

Jordan (quot;Pillage and propertyquot;, JET 2006) defined quot;pillage gamesquot;, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a `power function' satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite....