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Chapter 16. Formation of Networks and Coalitions
Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 729-779). 2011
This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … discussion of efficient network and coalition formation procedures and directions for future research. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025687
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The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2004
of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … a player within that coalition is induced by the social structure and is measured by a power function. We call a payoff …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325448
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Intuition, Deliberation, and Cooperation : Further Meta-Analytic Evidence from 91 Experiments on Pure Cooperation
Rand, David G. - 2019
What is the role of intuitive versus deliberative cognitive processing in human cooperation? The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) stipulates that (i) intuition favors behaviors that are typically advantageous (i.e. long-run payoff-maximizing), and that for most people cooperation is typically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870482
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Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games with Suspended Realizations of Threats
Cao, Zhigang - 2014
The Hart-and-Mas-Colell bargaining model [Hart and Mas-Colell (2010). “Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games.” Journal of the European Economics Association, 8, 7-33], which is based on strategic form games, is a very promising model possessing many beautiful features....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066306
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Consistent Cost Sharing
Koster, Maurice - 2008
A new concept of consistency for cost sharing solutions is discussed, analyzed, and related to the homonymous property within the rationing context. The class of additive and consistent mechanisms is isomorphic to the class of consistent and monotonic rationing methods. Consequently average and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058131
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The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2004
of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … a player within that coalition is induced by the social structure and is measured by a power function. We call a payoff …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335223
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The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2004
of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … a player within that coalition is induced by the social structure and is measured by a power function. We call a payoff …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029351
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Chapter 56 Values of games with infinitely many players
Neyman, Abraham - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2121-2167). 2002
This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are models of interactions with many players. Often most of the players are individually insignificant, and are effective in the game only via coalitions. At the same time there may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024489
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Shapley's Value and Its Axiomatization in Games with Prior Probabilities of Coalition Formation
Kamionko, Vladimir; Marakulin, Valeriy M. - 2020
are used: relations between the players and the probability of coalition formation. We suggest and study the sufficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014102140
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Inequality, coalitions and collective action
Bardhan, Pranab K.; Singh, Nirvikar - 2004
In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011520520