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Procurement design with corruption

Burguet, Roberto - 2015 - This version: March 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011443109

Bribery and favoritism by auctioneers in sealed-bid auctions

Burguet, Roberto (contributor); … - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 7 (2007) 1, pp. 1-25

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003738161

Competitive procurement with corruption

Burguet, Roberto; Che, Yeon-Koo - In: The Rand journal of economics 35 (2004) 1, pp. 50-68

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002079749

Competitive procurement with corruption

Burguet, Roberto; Che, Yeon-Koo - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001711305

Cartels and bribes

Burguet, Roberto; Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2021

We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. As in Dixit (2015, 2016), cooperation among honest suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697250