In the standard model of human capital with perfect labor markets, workers pay for general training. When labor market feictions compress the structure of wages, firms may invest in the general skills of their employees. The reason is that the d istortion in the wage structure turns...

In market economies, identical workers appear to receive very different wages, violating the "law of one price" of Walrasian markets. We argue in this paper that in the absence of a Walrasian autioneers to coordinate trade": (i) wage dispersion among identical workers is very often an...

This paper has three goals; first to place U.S. job growth in international perspective by exploring cross-country differences in employment and population growth. The second goal is to evaluate the labor markets rigidities hypothesis. Although greater wage flexiblity probably contributes to the...

This paper offers an alternative theory for the increase in unemployment and wage inequality experienced in the U.S. over the past two decades. In my model firms decide the composition of jobs and then match with skilled and unskilled workers.

A central determinant of the political economy of capital-labor relations is tha appropriability of specific quasi-rents. This paper is concerned with the general-equilibrium interaction of appropriability and characteristics of technology - nam ely, the embodiment of technology in capital and...

This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive.