We examine the CEO turnover in LBOs backed by private equity funds. When a company is taken private, we find that the CEO turnover decreases and is less contingent on performance. We also find that a higher involvement of the LBO sponsors, who replace the outside directors on the board after...

We investigate the impact of venture capitalists on the turnover of executives within a sample of nearly 46,500 German high-tech start-up companies founded between 1995 and 2004. We confirm that the presence of VCs increases the chances that the company will change the structure of its initial...

We provide causal evidence that venture capitalists (VCs) improve the performance of their portfolio companies by replacing founders. Augmenting a database of U.S.-based, VC-backed startups founded from 1995-2008 with hand-collected information regarding turnover, we exploit shocks to the supply...

We examine the effect of labor mobility on venture capital (VC) investment. Following the staggered adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine that restricts labor mobility, VCs are less likely to invest in affected states. This effect is more pronounced when human capital is more important...

How does firm-specific human capital shape workers’ career trajectories? We develop a model that allows workers to accumulate both portable and non-portable (firm-specific) human capital through their work experience and learn about their match quality with current employers over time. The...

Using stock market shocks to randomize the completion of a firm's liquidity event, I provide evidence that illiquid equity constrains labor mobility and talent allocation. I find that illiquidity reduces the mobility of employees with vested equity, while employees with unvested equity remain...