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Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation

Innes, Robert D. - In: International review of law and economics 24 (2004) 1, pp. 29-48

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002168370

Violator avoidance and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement

Innes, Robert D. - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 17 (2001) 1, pp. 239-256

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001582757

Parties, politics, and regulation : evidence from clean air act enforcement

Innes, Robert D.; Mitra, Arnab - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 53 (2015) 1, pp. 522-539

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343717

Voluntary pollution reductions and the enforcement of environmental law : an empirical study of the 33/50 program

Innes, Robert D.; Sam, Abdoul G. - In: The journal of law & economics 51 (2008) 2, pp. 271-296

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003762457

Fines, appeals and liability in public enforcement with stochastic damage and asymmetric information

Innes, Robert D. - In: Economica 71 (2004), pp. 391-416

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002134027

Fines, Appeals and Liability in Public Enforcement with Stochastic Damage and Asymmetric Information

Innes, Robert - 2004

This paper studies an enforcement game between a regulator and firms that can cause harmful accidents. The distribution of potential accident damage is private information to the firms, and realized damage can be observed only at the cost of going to court. Under conditions described in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070856