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This paper studies price dynamics in a setting in which a monopolist sells a new experience good over time to many buyers, and the seller can neither price discriminate among the buyers nor commit to a price rule. Buyers learn from their own experiences about the effectiveness of the product....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189761
A player׳s knowledge of her own actions and the corresponding payoffs may enable her to infer or form beliefs about what the payoffs would have been if she had played differently. For quantitative learning models employed in studies of low information environments, players׳ ex-post inferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190674
This paper analyses a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits.At least one of the arms is risky in the sense that it may not yield a lumpsum payoff. There is payoff externality between the players and they differ in their ability to learn across the risky arm. Either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883460
This note extends Wiseman [6] to more general reputation games with exogenous learning. Using Gossner's [4] relative entropy method, we provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the long-lived player. The lower bound shows that when the exogenous signals are sufficiently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930785
We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors differ with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042991
This paper considers a two-armed bandit problem with one safe arm and one risky arm. The risky arm if good, can potentially experience two kinds of arrivals. One is publicly observable and the other is private to the agent who experiences it. The safe arm experiences publicly observable arrivals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743477
Why do people stall while bargaining? Why are people keen to conclude a deal quickly, only to subsequently allow delay before the pie is realised? We propose that the reason is not fully explained by discount rates in combination with agents being engaged in a signalling equilibrium with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090621
This paper develops and structurally estimates a learning model in which firms acquire information about workers' ability by observing their performance over time. A firm consists of a collection of jobs which differ in the informational content of performance, as measured by the dispersion in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090831
We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value of one product offered is unknown to the market. The market participants learn more about the true value of the product as experimentation occurs over time. Firms set prices to induce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093954
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069421