We study the problem of a policymaker who seeks to set policy optimally in an economy where the true economic structure is unobserved, and he optimally learns from observations of the economy. This is a classic problem of learning and control, variants of which have been studied in the past, but...

We study the problem of a policymaker who seeks to set policy optimally in an economy where the true economic structure is unobserved, and policymakers optimally learn from their observations of the economy. This is a classic problem of learning and control, variants of which have been studied...

This paper suggests a solution to the puzzling finding documented in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) that the return to an index of private equity is equal to the return to the CRSP index of public equity even though investment in private firms is substantially riskier. It presents an...

Recent empirical findings have emphasized post entry growth of survivors, as opposed to exit of inefficient and small firms, as the main source of growth over time in the average size of a cohort of entering firms. One proposed explanation for the post entry growth of survivors is financing...

We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information in a dynamic beauty contest model when they do not observe aggregate variables, such as prices or quantities, but randomly observe each other's actions. We solve for the market equilibrium and find that the average learning...

This paper studies the following problem. An agent takes actions based on a possibly misspecified model. The agent is 'large', in the sense that his actions influence the model he is trying to learn about. The agent is aware of potential model misspecification and tries to detect it, in...

We study adoption of a costly new technology when the profitability of the new technique differs over individuals and there is uncertainty about these individual-specific differences. We establish that such individual-specific uncertainty results in a financing constraint when debt contracts are...

This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. However, the nature of the inefficiency depends on the balance between the two key...

This paper develops and structurally estimates a learning model in which firms acquire information about workers' ability by observing their performance over time. A firm consists of a collection of jobs which differ in the informational content of performance, as measured by the dispersion in...