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Reassessing the Impact of High Performance Workplaces

Zwick, Thomas; Wolf, Elke - 2002

High performance workplace practices were extolled as an efficient means to increase firm productivity. The empirical evidence is disputed, however. To assess the productivity effects of a broad variety of measures, we simultaneously account for both unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298114

Benevolent government, managerial incentives, and the virtues of privatization

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2002

We show that privatization can be beneficial even if the government is rational and benevolent, and if the firm's economic and informational environment is independent of the governance structure. The model assumes that wage contracts between the firm's owner (government or private entrepreneur)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335738

Sharing Information through Delegation and Collaboration

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2004

This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior worker by verbal communication, and explains why communication is often tied up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model has two important features. First, the manager has more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325390

Social Relations and Relational Incentives

Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - 2012

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326344

Social Norms and Optimal Incentives in Firms

Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen - 2001

This paper deals with the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We outline a simple model of team production and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The effect of the social norm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334848

Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2004

Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate agents to exert productive effort. Unfortunately, however, an agent may also be tempted to destroy the production of his competitors in order to improve the own relative position....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262080

On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

Sliwka, Dirk - 2003

By enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent's motivation. In a first step, we allow for the possibility that some agents stick to unverifiable agreements. The larger the fraction of reliable agents, the lower powered will then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263084

The Boundary of the Firm in a Model of Trade Within a Hierarchy

Levy, Nadav - 2003

this is satisfied not only under the assumption of full commitment by the general office of the firm, but also … interestingly, if it has no commitment power at all. At the time of trade, the uninformed general office prefers to delegate the … emerges only if we assume that the general office retains some limited commitment power. The general office may then mandate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263343

The rise of individual performance pay

Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond - 2007

Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human capital intensive industries? We present a model that may explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peer dependent incentive regimes when agents possess indispensable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264248

Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams: theory and evidence

Mohnen, Alwine; Pokorny, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - 2008

We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268881

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