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We consider a single-principal/multi-agent model to investigate the principal's preferences over delegated contracting. The analysis extends the single-agent/multi-task LEN model in Feltham and Xie (1994) to a multi-agent/multi-task context. We consider full-commitment contracts, i.e., the...
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The present study began with Jerry Feltham’s invitation to present at the Stanford Summer Camp in August 2003. As we were variously involved in related work on performance measurement and dynamic incentives, Peter, Jerry, Christian, and Florin teamed up and the result was Christensen, Feltham,...
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