Performance aggregation and decentralized contracting
Year of publication: |
January 2016
|
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Authors: | Feltham, Gerald A. ; Hofmann, Christian ; Indjejikian, J. Raffi |
Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Lakewood Ranch, FL : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 91.2016, 1, p. 99-117
|
Subject: | delegation | hierarchies | incentives | multi-agent contracting | performance evaluation | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Hierarchie | Hierarchy | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling |
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