Showing 1 - 10 of 666
Recent thinking has emphasized the importance of consistency in a firm?s compensation policy. By starting from Williamson?s ideas about idiosyncratic exchange, this view can be supplied with some theoretical foundation. At the same time, the consistency view can be applied to a number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261986
Recent thinking has emphasized the importance of consistency in a firm's compensation policy. By starting from Williamson's ideas about idiosyncratic exchange, this view can be supplied with some theoretical foundation. At the same time, the consistency view can be applied to a number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320057
Using the pay gap between a firm’s CEO and the highest-paid CEO among similar competing firms to conceptualize the prize of winning external promotion tournaments, we document a positive relationship between external tournament incentives (ETIs) and IPO underpricing – a proxy of the cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014235856
We model and empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs. The measures we develop for the tournament prize derive from the compensation gap between the CEO at her firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar competing firms. The model predicts that firm performance and risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975384
This paper builds on Rosen (1981) and Hvide (2002) to provide a simple framework that elucidates the nature of incentives in the tournaments among top executives in both the external managerial labor market for the top executive positions in other companies and within the executives' own firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842651
We present robust evidence that firms enlarge the executive pay gap when executive mobility is constrained by the enhanced enforceability of non-compete agreements. We interpret this finding as evidence that firms increase tournament incentives to keep executives incentivized after the loss of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014350043
Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261193
Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to induce risk neutrality in otherwise risk averse agents. In an experiment, we find that subjects acting as executives do also take risks that are excessive from the perspective of shareholders if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427611
This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117143
Empirical research on the principal-agent model has focused almost exclusively on the incentives provided to chief executive officers. However, the model is also directly relevant to the incentives provided to other top executives. Furthermore, the extent to which other executives will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027832