We consider a principal-multi agent model that features a three-tier hierarchy, defined as a setting where the principal contracts with an agent-manager and delegates to the manager some authority to contract with other agents. A key highlight is that incentive compensation, performance...

We study three elements of management control: incentive compensation, performance monitoring, and delegation of authority to managers to contract with lower-level employees. Using a principal-agent model, we highlight important direct and indirect interactions between and among these endogenous...

Organizations often introduce temporary incentive programs with a view of establishing long lasting behaviors. Monetary payoffs are awarded upon achievement of team goals, which measure the success of the initiative. In this study I explore whether and how organizational behavior modifications...

Ein typisches Ergebnis einfacher Prinzipal-Agent-Modelle ist, dass die Arbeitsanstrengung des Agenten lediglich vom leistungsabhängigen Teil der Vergütung getrieben wird. In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, dass dies nicht notwendigerweise gilt, wenn Agenten referenzpunktabhängige Präferenzen und...

This study explores the effect of employee organizational identity on developing effective compensation contracts to improve organizational performance. We adopt the economic identity theory to mathematically model and test this model using data from a Japanese listed firm that uses an...

Firms often use stock-based incentives (SBIs) to attract and motivate talented employees. Thus, the question of how and on what basis to determine SBIs is an important issue for a firm. In this paper, we study determinants of SBIs based on data of Korean listed firms in 2002-2018. As a measure...

Setting targets and providing monetary incentives are two widely used motivating tools to achieve desirable organizational outcomes. We focus on reduction of carbon emissions as a setting in which to examine how target difficulty and monetary incentives provided to managers affect the degree of...

This paper provides a formal analysis on how to design accrual based incentive systems so that a manager's and owner's interests are properly aligned. We introduce a general framework to summarize the literature, provide various extensions to it, and point to some of its limitations. We...

In this study we examine the effect of incentive contract framing on agent effort in an incomplete contract setting. Prior research suggests that when governed by complete incentive contracts, agents exert greater effort under penalty contracts relative to bonus contracts. However, in an...

We investigate an emerging pay-performance activism under a natural setting of performance-focused shareholder proposals rule (PSPs) (Rule 14a-8) established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for top management compensation. We find that: (1) PSP sponsors successfully identify...