price to push for higher-powered and more short-term focused equity incentives. Such managers also work harder, and …

price to push for higher powered and more short‐term‐focused equity incentives. Such managers also work harder, and …

The extant literature has used measurements of CEO risk-taking incentives which do not include the effects of …-taking incentives but also proposes a new, more direct, measure of risk-taking incentives — compensation gamma. Results show that vega …-taking incentives under normal conditions …

-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence … between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the model to individual CEO data and show that it can explain … with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options. We conclude that the provision of risk-taking incentives is a …

incentives. To circumvent this problem, I form an estimate of the changes in CEO incentives caused by exogenous stock price … measure of the CEO's discretion over her incentive portfolio and show that the greater this discretion the less incentives …

This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an … increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega … offsetting equity stakes in borrowing firms. These results together suggest banks have a unique role in monitoring and shaping …