We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we...

We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we...

We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we...

Meine Dissertation hat vier Kapitel. In allen Kapiteln benutze ich Wettkampfmodelle um politökonomische Fragestellungen zu untersuchen. In Kapitel 1 untersuchen ich und meine Koautorin Dana Sisak welchen Effekt öffentliche Meinungsumfragen für das Verhalten von konkurrierenden Parteien in...