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Does say on pay matter? : evidence from the German natural experiment
Troeger, Tobias H.; Walz, Uwe - 2016
. When considering only the overall board members' compensation, the hypothesis of lower remuneration in case of low …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539853
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Managerial Remuneration and Disciplining in the UK : A Tale of Two Governance Regimes
Renneboog, Luc - 2010
We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two … to CEO remuneration, we sketch a nuanced picture as we find some evidence supporting the alignment of interests … hypothesis, but also supporting the managerial power or skimming model for managerial remuneration practices in the UK prior to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135217
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Does say on pay matter? : evidence from Germany
Tröger, Tobias; Walz, Uwe - 2019
remuneration is decreased if shareholder support for compensation schemes is low in say on pay-votes finds only weak support, if … analytical approach for say on pay-regimes. Any evaluation of a shareholder voice-strategy in regulating executive remuneration … has to pay close attention to the limits contract law stipulates for the adaptation of existing remuneration agreements …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061896
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An activist view of CEO compensation
Baum, Alex; Hale, Robert; Morfit, Mason; Larcker, David F. - 2017
Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307
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Uncapping Executive Pay
Doran, Michael - 2017
This article sets out the case for repealing the $1 million tax cap on executive pay. The cap is easily avoided and, when not avoided, widely ignored. Since enactment in 1993, the cap has had little effect in reducing executive pay or in linking pay to performance. Even worse, the cap increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965067
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Subjective CEO Pay and Long-Term Incentives
Ma, Fangyuan - 2019
I find that corporate boards frequently link CEO compensation to subjective performance measures that are neither accounting ratios nor stock returns. Subjective measurement incorporates soft information privately observed by the board about the CEO's contribution to long-term firm value. I show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895181
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CEO Compensation and the Role of In-House Experience
Brockman, Paul - 2012
We hand collect a database that includes a direct measure of the incoming CEO's in-house experience at the time of succession. In contrast to previous studies that rely on an insider-outsider binary variable, our continuous variable allows us to examine compensation incentives following CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109002
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Determinants of CEO Compensation : Generalist-Specialist Versus Insider-Outsider Attributes
Brockman, Paul - 2017
We examine the distinct effects of generalist-specialist versus insider-outsider attributes on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation patterns. Our cross-sectional results show that each attribute has a significant impact on both the level and structure of CEO compensation. CEOs with a high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960960
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Skilled Labor Risk and Compensation Policies
Qiu, Yue - 2019
We measure U.S. publicly traded companies' exposures to skilled labor risk, i.e., the potential failure in attracting and retaining skilled labor, by the intensity of their discussions on this issue in their 10-K filings. We show that this measure effectively captures firm risk due to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902137
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CEO Compensation and Covenant Violations
Francis, Bill B. - 2020
This paper investigates the impact of managerial compensation on the likelihood of covenant violations and reports that higher CEO risk-shifting incentives significantly increase the likelihood of covenant violations. Evidence suggests that CEOs with creditor unfriendly compensation in leveraged...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857455