We study the differences in behavior of males and females in a two-player tournament with sabotage in a controlled lab … experiment. Implementing a real-effort design and a principal who is paid based on the agent s output, we find that males and … significantly more sabotage leading to an on average higher winning probability but not to higher profits. If the gender of the …

This study experimentally investigates gender quotas in light of peer review. We investigate competitions with and … without gender quotas and a peer review process that allows for sabotage. Our findings show that the possibility of peer … sabotage renders the gender quota ineffective in encouraging women to enter tournaments and reversing gender pay gaps. Moreover …

overconfidence combined with competitive workplace incentives affects gender equality in the labor market. Our main result is that …

Gender differences in overconfidence have been extensively documented in the empirical literature, but the implications …, combined with competitive job incentives, affects gender equality in the labor market and discuss policy implications. The …

This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects … rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find that output is higher in the variable pay schemes (piece rate …, tournament, and revenue sharing) compared to the fixed payment scheme. This difference is largely driven by productivity sorting …

This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects … rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find that output is higher in the variable pay schemes (piece rate …, tournament, and revenue sharing) compared to the fixed payment scheme. This difference is largely driven by productivity sorting …

differences between men and women, can provide a plausible explanation. We conduct an experiment on a Dutch online survey panel to …

This paper analyzes gender differences in access to competitive positions. We implement an experiment where workers can … apply for a job promotion by sending a signal to their employer. We control for gender differences in anticipation of … where workers cannot send signals. We find that gender disparity among promoted workers is highest when workers can apply …

We show that choices in competitive behavior may entail a gender wage gap. In our experi ments, employees first choose … a remuneration scheme (competitive tournament vs. piece rate) and then conduct a real-effort task. Employers know the … pie size the employee has generated, the remuneration scheme chosen, and the employee's gender. Employers then decide how …