This paper presents a two-party model in which partisan and opportunistic politicians have two options: (i) to reach an agreement with respect to the central banker before elections are held, which leads to elections becoming a toss up, or (ii) to let the citizens vote for their proposed central...

This paper considers a model of firms' financing based on the existence of a moral hazard problem in the choice of investment projects by a heterogeneous population of entrepreneurs. Two alternative ways of funding these projects, called unmonitored (or market) and monitored (or bank) lending,...

We construct a model to nalyze the two types of tender procedures used by the European Central Bank in its open market operations. We assume that the ECB minimizes the expected value of a loss function that depends on the quadratic difference between the interbank rate and a target interest rate...

In this paper we study the relationship between labor market institutions and monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how optimal monetary policy rules depend on labor institutions (labor adjustment costs, and nominal and real wage rigitidy) and social preferences...

This paper proposes and implements a strategy for identifying and estimating the monetary feedback rule used by the Bank of Spain in the period from 1988 to 1996. We present evidence that the estimated feedback rule is plausible and use it to measure the response of the term structure of...