deliberately provide managers with risk-taking incentives to address risk-related agency conflicts and these incentives do not … effects of managers' stock holdings by showing that these incentives vary based on firms' value-risk tradeoffs … managers' incentive compensation packages. I find that shareholder value increases with risk and therefore managerial risk …

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at …-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and greater pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta). These effects are more substantial if VC …-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly, we find that having VC directors on nominating and/or governance …

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at …-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta). These effects are more substantial if VC directors are … boards of public firms is partly explained by increased risk-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly …

between business strategy and managerial incentives affects the organization of business activities. We illustrate the impact …

findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is …

the level of implementation of various incentives in three countries: Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The …

While in the US stock-based incentives are commonly used since the 50s of the last century, in Germany they were … incentives. In the meantime the legal environment has changed significantly and today even the German Corporate Governance Code … encourages firms to grant stock-based long-term incentives. However, examining a hand-collected unique data-set we find that even …