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Executive Quirks in Operational Decisions
Lai, Richard K. - 2006
We ask if corporate executives have fixed effects (quirks) that explain perational decisions made in firms, independent of firm effects. We replicate the approach in Bertrand et al. (2003), solving the empirical challenge of distinguishing firm and executive effects by constructing a dataset of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027516
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Stock options and chief executive officer compensation
Armstrong, Christopher (contributor);  … - 2007
Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive o±cer (CEO) compensation contracts, there is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782064
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Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects
Kaniel, Ron - 2020
reduces the intermediary's information advantage. We show that in response, the intermediary starts churning well …-performing agents she knows to be less skilled. Despite leading to an accelerated reduction in information advantage, such selectivity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842301
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Short-Termism, Managerial Talent, and Firm Value
Thakor, Richard T. - 2020
This paper examines how the firm's choice of investment horizon interacts with rent-seeking by privately-informed, multi-tasking managers and the labor market. There are two main results. First, managers prefer longer-horizon projects that permit them to extract higher rents from firms, so...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828916
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Incentives for CEOS with Multitasks : Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
Bai, Chong-En; Xu, Lixin Colin - 2005
compensation theoretically and empirically. Using a panel data set of CEO contracts from more than 300 Chinese state … contracts. Our findings about the determinants of incentive devices in China support predictions of the agency theory and the … incomplete contracts theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066297
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Multistage Financing : Milestone Bonuses or Deferred Compensation
Back, Kerry; Kakhbod, Ali; Xing, Hao - 2022
We develop a dynamic principal-agent model for financing a multistage project. The optimal contract displays the following unique features: (i) There is a pecking order between milestone bonuses and deferred compensation: when an intermediate stage succeeds, principal prefers to use deferred...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013406181
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The System of Incentives for CEOS with Multitasks : Theory and Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
Bai, Chong-En; Xu, Lixin Colin - 2003
panel data set of CEO contracts from more than 300 state-owned enterprises in China, support most of the theoretical … designing CEO contracts. Our findings about the determinants of the incentive devices offer support to some notions in agency … theory and the literature on incomplete contracts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084983
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Pressured to Perform : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment of Initial CEO Contract Length and M&As
Chen, Guoli; Huang, Ronghong; Mei, Shunji; Tan, Jui Keng - 2021
engage in more visible efforts via mergers and acquisitions (M&As). By using CEO initial fixed-term contracts and exploiting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240457
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Incentive contract design for projects : the owne's perspective
Kerkhove, L. P.; Vanhoucke, Mario - In: Omega : the international journal of management science 62 (2016), pp. 93-114
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489963
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Strategic Information Spillover to Be Imitated : Incentive to Make Use of Relative Performance Evaluation
Yoon, Young-Ro - 2007
In this article, we deal with the topic of intentional information spillover using a model in which both informational … are heterogeneous in the quality of their information, compete with one another in a common task. According to the results … action. When acting without a delay, they reveal their information with the hope that others will imitate them. This type of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014049222