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Does say on pay matter? : evidence from the German natural experiment
Troeger, Tobias H.; Walz, Uwe - 2016
. When considering only the overall board members' compensation, the hypothesis of lower remuneration in case of low …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539853
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Managerial Remuneration and Disciplining in the UK : A Tale of Two Governance Regimes
Renneboog, Luc - 2010
We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two … to CEO remuneration, we sketch a nuanced picture as we find some evidence supporting the alignment of interests … hypothesis, but also supporting the managerial power or skimming model for managerial remuneration practices in the UK prior to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135217
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Does say on pay matter? : evidence from Germany
Tröger, Tobias; Walz, Uwe - 2019
remuneration is decreased if shareholder support for compensation schemes is low in say on pay-votes finds only weak support, if … analytical approach for say on pay-regimes. Any evaluation of a shareholder voice-strategy in regulating executive remuneration … has to pay close attention to the limits contract law stipulates for the adaptation of existing remuneration agreements …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061896
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An activist view of CEO compensation
Baum, Alex; Hale, Robert; Morfit, Mason; Larcker, David F. - 2017
Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307
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Uncapping Executive Pay
Doran, Michael - 2017
This article sets out the case for repealing the $1 million tax cap on executive pay. The cap is easily avoided and, when not avoided, widely ignored. Since enactment in 1993, the cap has had little effect in reducing executive pay or in linking pay to performance. Even worse, the cap increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965067
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Determinants of director compensation in two-tier systems : evidence from German panel data
Andreas, Jörn Michael; Rapp, Marc Steffen; Wolff, Michael - 2010
Building on a unique panel data set of German Prime Standard companies for the period 2005-2008, this paper investigates the influencing factors of both director compensation levels and structure, i.e. the probability of performance-based compensation. Drawing on agency theory arguments and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008660025
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Executive Compensation Consultants
Bender, Ruth - 2011
Remuneration consultants are an integral part of the process of determining executive pay in large listed companies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128348
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Are Dissenting Directors Rewarded?
Marshall, Cassandra D. - 2011
I explore whether directors who resign in dissent from their board are rewarded in the labor market for directors. Using a hand collected sample of 278 boardroom disputes reported in 8-K filings during 1995-2006, I show that firms which have disputes are small, highly levered, have poor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133018
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Aktuelle Entwicklungen bei der Aufsichtsratsvergütung (Current Trends in the Compensation of Non-Executive Directors in Germany)
Metzner, Yves - 2012
We document three current trends in the compensation of non-executive directors in Germany. First, firms increasingly use performance-insensitive variable pay components, like committee and attendance fees. Second, this comes at the expense of performance-oriented variable pay components, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098535
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Corporate Lobbying and CEO Pay
Skaife, Hollis Ashbaugh - 2013
This study examines the agency costs of corporate lobbying by exploring the relation between lobbying and excess CEO compensation. We show that CEOs of firms engaged in lobbying earn significantly greater compensation levels compared to CEOs in non-lobbying firms, after controlling for standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074468