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Standard anticorruption interventions consist of intensified monitoring and sanctioning. Rooted in principal-agent theory, these interventions are based on the assumption that corrupt acts follow a rational cost-benefit calculation by gain-seeking individuals. Given their mixed results, however,...
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support for this argument. -- asset stripping ; law enforcement ; corruption ; transition …
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During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process...
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In spite of tremendous research on the relationship between HPWS and firm performance, a paucity of them has examined the antecedent of HPWS. Data were collected from CEOs and HRM managers from 311 firms including state-owned, private and foreign invested enterprises. Multiple regression...
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White-collar criminology scholarship shows that “accounting control frauds” (frauds led by the CEO) use accounting fraud to deceive (or suborn) sophisticated financial market participants. Large control frauds cause greater financial losses than all other forms of property crimes combined....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144769
This paper examines the interaction between propensity to corrupt (PTC) and firm performance. First, I use unique data from Moscow traffic violations to build an individual measure of PTC for every Muscovite with a driver's license (3.1 million people). Next, I determine the PTC for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091347
This paper presents a novel theory of corruption in public procurement. It considers an agency setting of contract … politician chooses a relatively lax auditing in order to create an incentive for cost-padding, and engages in corruption with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012983252