Berle and Means's analysis of the corporation - in particular, their view that those in control are not the owners of the corporation - raises questions about actions that corporations take to counter concerns regarding management's influence. What mechanisms, if any, do corporations implement...

“If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet depreciate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. This struggle may...

This study was based on the hypothesis that a fund manager has incentive to take more risk with funds to conceal his actual management ability. A theoretical model was built to test this hypothesis. According to the model, when a fund manager's ability is not observable, a poor fund manager may...

Forecasters predicting how people change their behavior in response to a treatment or intervention often consider a set of alternatives. In contrast, those who are treated are typically exposed to only one of the treatment alternatives. For example, managers selecting a wage schedule consider a...

The paper integrates agency theory with the asset-pricing model to explore causes of subprime mortgage crisis regarding the role of CEOs in financial firms. When maximizing their interests, CEOs behave under the influence of incentive structures, peer pressure and market power. Increasing peer...

In contemporary business environment is management one among most powerful groups in organizations, since management importantly influences operations and future success of an organization. Manager's work and behavior are importantly dependent upon several interrelated inside and outside (i.e....

The paper addresses the subprime mortgage crisis from the perspective of the CEO of a financial firm. We integrate agency theory with the asset-pricing model to explore factors affecting CEO risk aversion. Apart from wealth and effort, the two main factors in influencing the agent's risk...

Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital...

Little is known about why CEOs voluntarily purchase shares of their firm other than because they expect to directly profit from doing so. However, since CEOs are risk-averse, highly un-diversified, and face litigation costs from trading on favorable private information, direct profits are...