This paper studies managerial short-termism by considering a model in which two firms compete for a new investment opportunity. It shows that under competition firms may deliberately induce short-termism by tying managerial pay to short-term stock prices. Due to information asymmetry between...

We analytically study the economic consequences of the disclosure of managerial compensation contracts in a setting where two firms, by designing compensation contracts for their respective managers, compete for a new investment opportunity. Each manager is privately informed about her firm's...

We examine the effect of competition shocks induced by major industry-level tariff cuts on forced CEO turnover. Both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance increase, particularly for firms with low productivity and high default risk. While CEO's incentive pay...

Using the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), we examine whether an exogenously imposed disclosure reform that increases the amount of information affects the level of executive compensation. Extant theories suggest that disclosure reforms could either raise...